



**FOR REFLECTION** 

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## Canada–U.S. trade in a globalized economy: Elasticities, asymmetries, and policy imperatives

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## Aggregate trade data masks deeper interdependencies

Traditional trade metrics do not show the cross-border flows than define production today, where goods are co-produced across multiple countries. Bilateral trade balances provide a distorted view of economic relationships.

The U.S. trade deficit with Canada is largely driven by energy imports, while American firms benefit from services trade and embedded value-added components in

Canadian exports. Much of this trade occurs within multinational enterprises, making simplistic categorizations of exports and imports misleading.

A shift in perspective is needed—away from zero-sum narratives and toward policies that enhance global integration.

**Descriptive Statistics on Canada-U.S. Trade** 

Indicator

Canada GDP

**US GDP\*** 

Canada Exports to US

Value (CAD)

3,060 Billion

36,975 Billion\*

547 Billion

Canada Imports from US

Two-way Trade as % of Canada's GDP

Two-way Trade as % of US's GDP

**Canada Total Exports** 

Number of employer business locations in Canada (Dec 2022)

Percent of businesses that produce goods

30% 2.5%

719 Billion

1,200,000

21%

# Canada and the U.S. have a highly integrated yet asymmetric trade relationship

This is due to geographic proximity, well-established supply chains, and shared infrastructure. "Friendshoring" has further reinforced these connections, with Canada benefiting from U.S. initiatives to secure supply chains in critical sectors like minerals and energy.

Industries such as automotive manufacturing, machinery, and mineral fuel exports are

### particularly reliant on cross-border trade.



# Sectors respond to tariffs based on their trade elasticity and substitution potential

A 25% tariff on Canadian goods could significantly reduce trade volumes in key export sectors, underscoring the need for targeted policies to mitigate such risks.

Over time, persistent tariffs could lead to supply chain reconfigurations, with both countries adjusting to new sourcing strategies.

#### Elasticity by Industry and Tariffs' Impact on Trade for Main Export Sectors from Canada to the U.S.

	Total Value (CAD		Tariff	Trade	Estimated Trade Reduction*	Post-Tariff Trade Value*
Sector	Millions)	Estimated Elasticity	Rate	Reduction* (%)	(CAD Millions)	(CAD Millions)
Mineral fuels & oils (27)	177,390	Inelastic (-0.21)	0.10	2.1	3,725	173,665
Vehicles (87)	69,413	Moderately Inelastic	0.25	17.5	12,147	57,266
		(-0.7)				
Nuclear reactors, boilers,	38,864	Moderately Inelastic	0.25	17.5	6,801	32,063
machinery (84)		(-0.7)				
Plastics and articles thereof	19,390	Elastic (-1.1)	0.25	27.5	5,332	14,058
(39)						
Wood and articles of wood	15,852	Moderately Inelastic	0.25	20.0	3,170	12,682
(44)		(-0.8)				
Aluminium and articles	15,667	Inelastic (-0.4)	0.25	10.0	1,566	14,101

thereof (76)

Total of Above Sectors	384,858				38,204	346,654
thereof (88)						
Aircraft, spacecraft and parts	10,412	Inelastic (-0.5)	0.25	12.5	1,302	9,110
Iron and steel (72)	10,512	Inelastic (-0.4)	0.25	10.0	1,051	9,461
(71)						
Precious metals and stones	12,413	Inelastic (-0.4)	0.25	10.0	1,241	11,172
equipment (85)						
Electrical machinery and	14,945	Inelastic (-0.5)	0.25	12.5	1,868	13,077

### Regional differences exist in exports profiles

Ontario's auto-centric trade and Quebec's reliance on aluminum and aerospace goods exemplify varying elasticities. Ontario is more vulnerable due to its deep integration with U.S. manufacturing, while Quebec's exports, though inelastic, face substitution risks.

The elasticity of trade flows differs short-term versus long-term, with Ontario and Quebec showing how trade integration and overdependence on the U.S. can magnify

### risks.

#### Table 5: Ontario's Main Export Sectors to the U.S. (2024)

				Trade			
	Total Value (CAD	Estimated	Tariff	Reduction*	Estimated Trade	Post-Tariff Trade Value*	Average
Section Description	Millions)	Elasticity	Rate	(%)	Reduction* (CAD Millions)	(CAD Millions)	GVC Length
Vehicles (87)	60,129	Moderately	0.25	17.5	10,523	49,606	3.21
		Inelastic (-0.7)					
Nuclear reactors, boilers,	20,739	Moderately	0.25	17.5	3,629	17,110	2.82
machinery (84)		Inelastic (-0.7)					
Plastics and articles	9,876	Elastic (-1.1)	0.25	27.5	2,716	14,058	2.76
thereof (39)							

Table 6: Quebec's Main Export Sectors to the U.S. (2024)

#### Trade

	Total Value (CAD	Estimated	Tariff	Reduction*	Estimated Trade	Post-Tariff Trade Value*	Average
Section Description	Millions)	Elasticity	Rate	(%)	Reduction* (CAD Millions)	(CAD Millions)	GVC Length
Aluminium and articles	10,841	Inelastic (-0.4)	0.25	10.0	1,084	9,757	2.90
thereof (76)							
Nuclear reactors, boilers,	9,763	Moderately	0.25	17.5	1,709	8,054	2.80
machinery (84)		Inelastic (-0.7)					
Aircraft, spacecraft and	8,186	Inelastic (-0.5)	0.25	12.5	1,023	7,163	3.35
parts thereof (88)							

## Policy interventions must balance the benefits of economic integration and address vulnerabilities tied to this relationship

Diversification through alternative export markets or suppliers can reduce risks, but industries deeply embedded in cross-border supply chains face challenges in making swift adjustments.

Quebec's exports, such as aluminum and aerospace, have some diversification, but still remain highly U.S.-dependent. Ontario's automotive industry, a major exporter, also faces risks if disruptions arise, though some sectors show more elasticity.

In the face of tariffs, firms may adapt by relocating production or seeking alternative suppliers, but smaller, specialized regions may face greater difficulties. Over time, global sourcing and manufacturing practices may reduce integration, leading to clear winners and losers.

Policymakers should focus on granular data, understanding regional vulnerabilities, and adapting policies to foster resilience, especially in high-risk sectors like automotive and energy.

Protectionist policies disrupt global supply chains, leading to inefficiencies and ultimately harming overall economic growth. Instead, policymakers should embrace cooperation and integration to strengthen global value chains and promote shared prosperity.